A liberal exodus? Report reveals political diversity of new Russian migrants

Russia's war against Ukraine prompted hundreds of thousands of Russians to leave their country. Drawing on unique face-to-face surveys of Russian migrants in five different host countries, a new ZOiS report provides insights into the diversity of their political views and socio-economic profiles.

Of the estimated 800,000 to 900,000 Russians who left their country in the months after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, approximately 650,000 remain abroad. There is a tendency to view these migrants as a potential opposition-in-exile.

While a sizable share of the people who left Russia immediately after the invasion can be categorized as anti-war and anti Kremlin, this is far less true of the subsequent waves of migration. It is also unclear whether even the more opposition-minded Russian migrants will remain politically active in their host countries.

A new ZOiS report by Félix Krawatzek and Gwendolyn Sasse takes a closer look at the political attitudes of the new Russian migrants, focusing on five of the most important destination countries for Russian migration: Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

It draws on face-to-face surveys of 4,300 migrants conducted in the summer of 2023 across the five countries. The findings show the huge diversity they represent in terms of their political views and socio-economic profiles. As Krawatzek emphasizes, the new Russian migrants "are best not thought of as one group, and certainly not as one big liberal exodus."

While the country cases are not strictly comparable, the report captures important trends within and across the surveyed countries. And by including some members of more established Russian communities in their surveys, the authors are also able to compare old and new migrants.

Georgia and Armenia—different contexts for political mobilization

Both Georgia and Armenia attracted high shares of young and educated Russian migrants, many of whom came from St. Petersburg and Moscow and work in the IT sector. Significant numbers of them participated in protests back in Russia. In Armenia, a majority of Russians believe that Russians abroad should protest against their government.

Similarly, a clear majority of respondents in Georgia have a negative view of the Russian president and the Russian army and lay the blame for the war in Ukraine squarely at Russia's door. Despite the high level of politicization among migrants in both countries, the report underlines the importance of setting for determining whether they will remain politically active.

For historical reasons, Georgia is a generally hostile context for Russian migration. Ordinary Georgians also resent the new migrants for driving up inflation. Ironically, although many Russian migrants share the anti-Russian attitudes that prevail in Georgian society, this mutual alienation makes joint political actions unlikely.

For now, Armenia is a more welcoming host country and thus a more favorable setting for political actions directed at Russia.

Blame attribution for the war against Ukraine: A barometer of migrants' politics

The diversity of political opinions found among Russians in Turkey is striking. There is, however, a marked pro-Kremlin tendency, with a sizable share of migrants expressing positive views of the Russian president and blaming Ukraine and Western institutions for the war in Ukraine.

The majority of new Russian migrants in Kazakhstan seem to be politically in line with the mainstream of Russian society. Here too, blame for the war is placed more on the U.S. and Ukraine than on Russia. Russians in Kyrgyzstan appear to be quite politicized, with a majority reporting protest experience in Russia. When asked who they blame for the war, the largest share of respondents (50%) chose the response "Russia."

The authors of the report point to the implications of their findings for supporting political opposition outside Russia. Both old and new Russian migrants continue to be a key target of the Kremlin's propaganda and are likely to still be immersed in the Russian media environment.

Under these circumstances, Gwendolyn Sasse argues that it would be wise "to invest more in alternative Russian-language media and in efforts to forge connections between migrants in different countries."

Provided by Zentrum für Osteuropa- und internationale Studien (ZOiS)